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[Crim. No. 5816. In Bank. May 4, 1956.)

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. DOROTHY
DIXON, Appellant.
[1] Powons-Possession of Narcotics-Evidence.-A judgment of

conviction of illegal possession of narcotics will not be reversed
on the ground that the narcotics were found only after a
garage key was forcibly taken from defendant where no more
force was used than was reasonably necessary to take the key
from her hand.
[2] Criminal Law-Evidence-Evidence .Obtained b7 Unlawful
Seizure.-Where it appears from an officer's own testimony
that he and· other officers had no warrant for a search of
defendant's apartment or of a garage, the key to which was
taken from defendant's possession, and where there was no
evidence to justify their entry, arrest and search, evidence
obtained as a result of such search should be excluded.
[3] Id. - Evidence - Evidence Obtained b7 tJDlawful Seizure.Where defendant's testimony that her landlord forced her to
keep the narcotic found in an apartment garage, the key to
which was taken from her by arresting officers entering her
apartment without a warrant, was impelled by the erroneous
adnlission of illegally obtained evidence, such testimony cannot be segregated from the Hlcgnllyobtained evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction.
[2] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 393
et seq.
McE:. Dig. References: [1] Poisons, § 14; [2, 3] Criminal Law,
§ 410; [4] Searches and Seizures, § 1.
• Aaaigned by Chairman of Judicial Couneil.
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[4] Searches and Seizures-Legality.-If reasonable cause is shown
for the entry of defendnnt's npartment and her arrest (Pen.
Code, §§ 836, 844), the contemporaneous search of an apartment garage, the key to which was taken frOID her possession
by the officers, would be a lawful search as an incident to that
arrest, since .the garage was on the premises and under
defendant's controL

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial.
Clement D. Nye, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for illegal possession of heroin. Judgment of
conviction reversed.
Dorothy Dixon, in pro. per., John H. Marshall and Henry
S. Rupp for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E.
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of
conviction entered after the court sitting without a jury found
her guilty of one count of possessing heroin. (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11500.) She also appeals from an order denying
her motion for a new trial.
Defendant resided in a court apartment rented from Ramona Lopez, who occupied another apartment of the same
court. Sometime during the evening of November 29, 1954,
Officer 0 'Grady of the Narcotic Division of the Los Angeles
Police Department entered and searched the apartment of
Mrs. Lopez but failed to find any narcotics or substances commonly used in cutting them.
Thereafter, at about 10 :30 p. m., Officer O'Grady, accompanied by Officer Kenne9-Y and State Narcotics Inspector
Wells, entered defendant's apartment, placed her under
arrest, and told her to remain seated on the bed while they
searched her apartment. They did not have a warrant. In
defendant's kitchen cupboard they found an opened carton
of milk sugar, which is used to cut heroin. Officer O'Grady
testified that defendant appeared extremely nervous and on
several occasions got up and "wandered around" the room
while the officers were searching it. He told her that if she
did not remain seated until they finished, it would be necessary to handcuff her. She insisted on going to the bathroom
and told him that she bad recently aborted herself and that
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she was "having difficulties." He offered to ea11 a
for her if one was necessary or to see that she received
cal attention before going to jail. As he turned his
she took something from the upper part of her dress.
ordered her to hand it to him, and when she refused
made a motion to place it in her mouth, he and the
officers seized her arms to keep the object from her
She kicked one of the officers, and in the ensuing IIJ;rUll'Il'If'!1
they lifted her onto the bed and forced a key from her
She admitted that it was the key to one of the Ant."hnA9I,tl
garages rented by her. Officer O'Grady and Inspector
entered the garage and found 10 latex bags containing
rations of heroin that had been cut with milk sugar.
ant produced keys to two other garages. In one of
the officers found a box of empty capsules.
People's case was submitted on the testimony in the
script of the preliminary hearing and the exhibits received
that hearing including the heroin, capsules, and milk
[1] Her contention that the judgment must be "A..,,._.,,,
on the basis of Bochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 [72
205, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1896], because the narcotics I
were found only· after the garage key was forcibly taken'
from her is without merit. The brutal and shocking force
condemned in that case was not present here; no more force
was used than was reasonably necessary to take the key;.
from her hand.
:i
[~] It follows, however, from the officer's own testimony i
that they had no warrant and from the absence of anY.J
evidence to justify their entry, arrest, and seareb that the1
evidence was illegally obtained and should therefore have;
been excluded. (People v. Cahan, 44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d
905]; Badillo v. Superior Court, ante, p. 269 [294 P.2<l
23].) [3] Defendant's testimony in explanation of her possession of the narcotic that Mrs. Lopez forced her to keep it
revealed that she knowingly possessed it. This testimony,
however, was impelled by the erroneous admission of the
illegally obtained evidence and cannot be segregated from
that evidence to IUStain the judgment. (Silverthorne L'br.
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 [40 S.Ct. 182, 64
L.Ed. 319, 24 A.L.R. 1426] ; People v. Berger, 44 Cal.2d 459,
462 [282 P.2d 509] ; Badillo v. Superior Courl, rupra, ante,
p.269.)
[4] It remains only to add for the guidance of the trial
court (Code Oiv. Proc., § 53) that if on a new trial reason-
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able cause is shown for the entry of defendant's apartment
and her arrest (Pen. Code, §§ 836, 844; see Peop~e v. Marlin,
45 Ca1.2d 755, 762 [290 P.2d 855) ; People v. Maddox, IInte,
p. 301 [294 P.2d 6] ; Willson v. Superior Court, ante, p. 291
[294 P.2d 36)), the contemporaneous search of the garage,
would be a lawful search as an incident to that arrest since
the garage was on the premises and under defendant's control.
(See United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 361, 363-364; KeUey v.
United States, 61 F.2d 843, 846-847 [86 A.L.R. 338] ; Dt,De~~o
v. United States, 19 F.2d 749, 750-751; United Statu v.
Charles, 8 F.2d 302; Fryar v. United Staies, 3 F.2d 598599; Sayers v. United States, 2 F.2d 146, 147-148; Stafe v.
Estes, 151 Wasb. 51 [274 P. 1053, 1054) ; cl. Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 [46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145, 51 A.L.R.
409] ; Application of Rose, 32 F.Supp. 103, 104; Peop~ v.
Gorg, 45 Ca1.2d 776, 782 [291 P.2d 469].)
The judgment and order are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of reversal but
prefer to base my concurrence upon the legal proposition
that the conduct of the law enforcement officers here not only
amounted to a violation of defendant's right of privacy
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States and section 19 of article I of the Constitution of California but also amounted to a denial of due
process of law guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States as
interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Rochin v. CaUlorm'a, 342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 205, 96
L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396].
SPENCE, J.-I dissent.
The record clearly shows that defendant had committed
and was committing a felony at the time of her arrest. I am
therefore of the opinion that the arrest was lawful (Pen.
Code, § 836, subd. 2); that the search made as an incident
of that arrest was a reasonable search; and that the evidence
obtained as the result of such search was properly admitted.
(See dissenting opinion in Badillo v. Superior Court, IInte,
pp. 269, 273 [294 P.2d 23].) I would affirm the judgment
and the order denying a new trial.
Shenk, J., concurred.

